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On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Hickman, Kennedy. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. . With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. 1, p. 646. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. 14. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. . This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 That very night, the idea was put to the test. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. "11 Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. Vietnam is a very watery country. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. In turn, that means The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. . There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. 17. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. The Navys seaborne SIGINT effort in support of OPLAN-34, called Desoto Missions, played a key role in the events that ultimately led to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. 302-303. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. 14. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. . Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. And who is going to believe that? William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. The United States denied involvement. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. . After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. 2. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Fluoride. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. 8. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. . By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. 3. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. He is the author of. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. ", "No," replied McCone. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American soldier casualties.

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